Scholarship in International Relations has witnessed that the traditional concept of hierarchically organized global climate governance is joined by a network model of decentralized governance, which involves multiple actors. New actors performing networked climate governance include national governments, subnational organizations like cities, international organizations, corporations, epistemic communities, and civil society organizations. An insightful literature on networked climate governance has advanced our conceptual understanding of this empirical phenomenon. In parallel, rapidly growing research in psychology, sociology, and economics, and related disciplines sheds light on factors that contribute to individuals' willingness to engage in collective climate action. This article reviews these seemingly disparate strands of literature and aims to build bridges between them. We focus on the factors underlying individuals' decisions to participate in local-level climate initiativesor grassroots organizations -including, for example, renewable energy cooperatives. Such initiatives are increasingly important parts of networked climate governance. Thus, networked governance can be conceived of as an opportunity structure for collective climate action, which may in turn influence citizens' decisions to participate. Given the urgency to address climate change, this approach adds a critical novel perspective to on-going debates about effective governance arrangements.
Introduction
After years of stalemate in international climate negotiations, 1 governments reached a new and universal climate change agreement to govern the post-Kyoto era at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCCC) in Paris. The Paris Agreement not only aims to limit global warming to 'well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels'; the Parties also agreed on 'pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C'. 2 Reaching this goal will require constant action and strong commitments from state and a range of other actors in both the developed and developing world, since the new climate governance system is based on so-called national pledges. 3 Moreover, there is consensus that incremental policy change will not suffice to respond to climate change, necessitating a society-wide transformation. 4, 5 This requires fundamental changes in production and consumption patterns, 6 thereby indicating that responses to climate change require broad support from collective actors in the economy, from society and from individuals alike. 7, 8 Today, global climate governance includes actors such as governments, international organizations and cities along with private actors such as corporations, epistemic communities, and civil society organizations. 9, 10 While the global climate governance architecture is fragmented and leads to different degrees of governance performance, 11 this new structure has noticeably increased the opportunities of private actors to participate in international climate politics. [12] [13] [14] However, triggering social change in response to climate change requires more far-reaching approaches, which calls for a greater involvement of citizens in climate governance. [4] [5] [6] 8, 14 Drawing on different strands of literature, this review contends that citizens play an increasingly important role in transnational climate governance with a growing number of citizen climate initiatives, which are consequently driven by the motivation of individuals to engage in collective climate action. 5, 7, 14 Having said that, we recognize that there is a specific literature -which is not reviewed here -elaborating on who expects individuals to get involved, what these actors' motivations are to mobilizing individuals, and how they facilitate and govern the individuals' involvement. 15, 16 Individuals can support climate protection by changing their consumption behaviour, signing petitions, or other forms of political activism, to name but a few examples. Another -and arguably more effective 17 -way to bring about system-wide transformations in response to climate change entails collective action. 14, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] Collective climate action such as neighbourhood-based climate protection initiatives is effective in three ways: First, membership in such citizen climate initiatives facilitates social learning and therefore brings about changes in the individuals' attitudes and behaviour; 5, 6, 19, 20 second, climate initiatives can pave the way for policy innovations; [28] [29] [30] third, especially institutionalized initiatives can influence climate politics as a collective actor. 14, 20, 22, 31 With regard to the third point, the new global architecture of climate governance promises more institutional venues and therefore more influence to citizen climate initiatives. We focus on institutionalized groups of individuals which are also addressed by the literatures on transnational advocacy or discourse networks, 32, 33 advocacy coalitions, 34, 35 and epistemic communities. 36 In this context, it should be noted that not all aspects of individuals and their respective behaviour apply directly to collective actors, even though certain aspects of broader questions on collective action do transpire.
Building on this premise, this review attempts to bring together two seemingly disparate research areas on collective climate action and networked climate governance with a view to advance both literatures and showcase the value of inter-disciplinary research. Learning about factors stimulating engagement in collective climate action provides valuable lessons for scholarship on networked climate governance on how to increase the effectiveness and inclusiveness of this governance mode.
The study of collective climate action can benefit from acknowledging networked governance as an opportunity structure for collective climate action. In line with McAdam, we define opportunity structures as exogenous factors that limit or empower collective action. 37 While McAdam concentrates on the political opportunity structures (i.e. openness of the institutionalized political system; stability of elite alignments; presence or elite allies; repression exercised by the state), our notion of opportunity structure is broader and encompasses any structures and incentives at the national or international level that encourage or discourage collective action. Our definition echoes the role Adger 22 assigns to the state in facilitating specific behavioural patterns.
The overall aim of this review is to demonstrate that both literatures constitute pieces of the same puzzle, which is about how we can adequately respond to the challenges of climate change. The key difference between the literatures concerns their levels of analysis, which at the same time also provides an opportunity for merging them. We first focus on the contributions the literatures make individually for solving this puzzle. The major strength of this review, however, stems from the second step, that is, its attempt to illustrate the complementarity of the two literatures. 13, 14, 22 By conceiving networked climate governance as an opportunity structure through which collective climate actiondefined as groups of individuals participating in the climate regime -can be facilitated, we strive to improve our understanding of how we can stimulate necessary processes of social change.
MAPPING THE TWO RESEACH AREAS
Addressing anthropogenic climate change represents a collective action problem par excellence. There is general consensus that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions -most importantly carbon dioxide (CO2)
-from human activities are the major drivers of global warming. 38 Limiting the global temperature increase to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels requires 'a profound transformation of energy systems, through steep declines in carbon intensity across all sectors'. 39 Doing so, however, requires collective action, that is, joint activities in the pursuit of a common interest. 14, 20, 22, 31 Assuming that individuals would weigh the benefits and costs of particular actions, Olson cautioned that the former would not act collectively due to participation costs. 40 Individuals would rather abstain from collective action and benefit from the actions of others. This social dilemma is known as 'freeriding'. Based on this rationale, collective action for the provision of a common good critically depends on whether or not benefits can only be obtained from participation. Hardin then extended this reasoning by highlighting the importance of states (through providing binding rules) or markets (through providing property rights) for achieving collective action. 41 In the case of climate change, the common pool resource at the centre of collective action may be understood as the relatively stable atmospheric conditions that have allowed natural and human activities to evolve. 42 However, since Hardin's early assertion that markets or states are indispensable to produce common goods, other scholars have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that there are other ways to overcome the collective action problem. Notably, Ostrom argued that carefully designed institutional arrangements can in some cases outperform states and markets to address collective action problems. 43 Studying mainly small to medium-sized common-pool resource systems, the Ostrom showed that in many cases, actors can self-organize to build enduring management systems, and that these arrangements are likely to be especially successful if they follow a number of institutional design principles: clearly defined boundaries; congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; collective-choice arrangements; monitoring; graduated sanctions; conflict resolution mechanisms; minimal recognition of rights to organize; nested enterprises for common pool resources that are part of larger systems.
Remarkably, collective action problems can and do occur both among individuals and states, meaning that free-riding affects the production of common goods in both realms. Therefore, even though at first glance the two levels of analysis seem disparate, the deeper and recurring question about collective action connects them. Another commonality is that despite free-riding, individuals and states engage in cooperation. 14, 20, 22, 43 But the two do not necessarily march in tandem: even when international negotiations are gridlocked or ineffective, the decentralized nature of transnational climate governance provides an opportunity structure for non-state actors such as citizens' climate initiatives to engage in cooperation.
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Collective climate action
The first theoretical and empirical phenomenon that this review addresses is collective climate action. In most cases, local initiatives form networks with other local initiatives and participate in networked governance as 'transnational networks' -a mode of operating that has also proven attractive for cities and municipalities that have formed their own networks (e.g. Energy Cities). 68 Cities engage in transnational climate partnerships through their own networks, but also by participating in broader transnational networks such as the Climate Action Network. 74 We can observe similar patterns for the participation of citizen climate initiatives in networked governance. 
DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION
Given that the devastating consequences of climate change, the contribution of human activities, and the difficulties of governments in adopting adequate policy responses manifest ever more strongly, civil society has become an important source of climate policy innovations and collective climate action. 67 But what motivates the individual to engage in such group-level collective action? This section addresses this research question by reviewing theories of behaviour change and pathway models to collective climate action. These scholarly debates offer insights into why individuals may or may not participate in actions at the group level.
Theories of behaviour change
How can we motivate individuals to take pro-environmental actions? This question has been addressed by a vast corpus of literature. 5 One of the most prominent explanations has been that individuals do not participate in pro-environmental actions due to their lack of information. 79 The corresponding literature argues that filling this information deficit should stimulate individual behaviour change. However, the simple view that providing people with information on climate change science will lead to direct and significant behaviour change in a linear way has been challenged quite early in the literature, as other factors such as pre-existing knowledge and structural constraints influence how individuals process and act on such information. 80 This is, of course, not to say that public climate change education is unnecessary and it certainly remains an important part of climate change governance, but precisely how and to whom one communicates influences how individuals receive and process information. 81 A key issue with climate change is that it is often perceived as hardly relevant to the individual's daily lives. 82 A suggested remedy thus involves tailoring climate change messages in order to highlight its proximal consequences. Yet Brügger et al. 83 explain that the effect of more localized climate change information depends very much on how that information interacts with the receiving individuals' general characteristics and how they process that information. For example, proximal information may act as a deterrent to individuals who value wider communities and the environment. 92 However, it is worth noting that wider beliefs about science in general influence how people interact with climate change. Recent research has shown that giving people messages about rapid progress in science tends to reduce their willingness to engage in pro-environmental behaviour. 96 By the same token, beliefs and appeals about environmental justice (e.g., the distributions of environmental effects on different groups in society) have been shown to influence proenvironmental intentions. 26 Finally, drawing on a survey of Swedish households, Nässén et al. 97 show that concerns over environmental protection and climate change, inter alia, lower the individuals' consumption-accounted GHG emissions.
The third literature builds upon social norms as drivers of pro-environmental behaviour. 5, 20 A social norm may be defined as what individuals deem normal behaviour in any given situation. 98 When used in informational interventions, norm-based messaging has been shown to strongly influence a range of individual decisions and behaviour related to climate change, including energy conservation or the use of environmental resources. 99 This also holds true for a range of climate-change related behaviour, and norms are often stronger than a range of other drivers. 23 Studies have shown that the most effective norm-based messages are those that correspond most closely with the characteristics of a group to which an individual belongs. 100 The relationship between norms and pro-environmental behaviour is further mediated by how connected individuals feel to a particular group from which they draw their norms. 101 However, using such descriptive social norms - 24 The fourth pathway refers to social identity theory, which is widely regarded as one of the most influential theories in social psychology. It rests on the assumption that individuals partly define themselves through group memberships, and come to think, feel, and act as group members. 23 Given this basic reasoning, social identity theory has been linked with a wide range of behavioural outcomes that can be understood as occurring out of the joint interest of the group. From this, it follows that a strong sense of collective identity is needed for group members to engage in collective action. 24 A further development of this perspective is the integrative social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) proposed by van Zomeren et al. 46 These scholars propose three underlying drivers of collective action, namely the perceived existence of a social injustice; efficacy (related to behavioural control -see above); and identity. In other words, it is a model that integrates the efficacy, the emotions and the identity pathways. Importantly, this theory goes beyond assessing individual behaviours and their correlates precisely because it takes into account the effects of group identity and issues such as politicization. This matters because collective action is, per definition, a group activity typically undertaken to achieve a common aim. More recent research has not only validated this model, but also begun to add potential additional factors, such as social norms and sense of group identity and collective responsibility. 23, 107 Taken together, there is thus a strong indication that in addition to the factors discussed above, identity and affect play important roles in stimulating collective action to address climate change. 111 At the most basic level, the characteristics of political systems matter: Because democracies offer more opportunities for participation and initiative than autocracies, the former are likely better at stimulating collective climate action than the latter. 15, 16, 47, 114, 115 Building on this line of thought, we argue that the changes in the global climate governance architecture and especially growing opportunities for non-state actor participation constitute an important contextual factor that is worth taking into consideration. 14, 22 More specifically, we argue that the notion of opportunity structure 37 is a fruitful concept to link the literatures on collective climate action with studies of networked climate governance. The use of the concept of opportunity structures allows for constructing an overarching analytical perspective that echoes prominent political science theories. For example, the influential advocacy coalition framework holds that the attainment of political goals is determined by the actor coalitions' beliefs and resources, as well as the strategies they apply given the institutional venue in which they operate. 33, 34 Carefully crafted strategic communication approaches can potentially address some of these difficulties. 117 Individuals need to understand that transnational climate partnerships exist and how they function, but at the same time communicators need to remain cognizant of local contexts as well as the full range of psycho-social and contextual factors we discussed above. To recall, collective climate action through grassroots organizations is an integrative component of networked climate governance. 62, 66, 70 Therefore, audiences need more systematic information about the global climate governance architecture and how the latter is linked with local-level action. However, when doing so, it matters immensely to take into account prevailing social norms, value orientations, pre-existing knowledge and other psycho-social variables, as well as the nature of wider social practices and the physical environment. 5, 13 For example, if there is already a social norm, or indeed a wider social practice to collaborate in other areas, and if people believe that climate change is a problem and value their natural environment as well as the well-being of other communities, and if the physical conditions are such that actions can reasonably be taken (e.g., there are feasible sources of renewable energies), then it makes sense to anchor any communication in these key community characteristics.
INTEGRATING COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION AND NETWORKED GOVERNANCE
When thinking of communication, one may think of the mass media, but communication is also transmitted in other forms. For example, politicians may invite citizens to participate in climate actions and explain that their efforts are not confined to the local level, but will transpire to higher levels.
Likewise, NGOs could communicate the nature of networked climate governance and how the existence of this structure helps to make a difference at the global level. Done in this way, improving knowledge about networked climate governance and potentially offering a range of other opportunities to engage could empower individuals to feel that their actions are meaningful and not confined to the local level, but that they can contribute -by participating in transnational climate networks -to solving the problem at the global level. 6 Doing so may especially engage young people
by showing them what they can do and how their actions have an impact beyond their neighbourhood. 81 Again, the Transitions Town movement is a suitable example. While being a local initiative, the members are committed to networking with a view to expanding the movement's geographical scope. 38, 54 The fact that the individual movements are local provides an important venue for individual involvement, while strategic communication about the geographical spread and membership in new transnational climate partnerships additionally signals that impact reaches well beyond the local level.
The discussion above shows that there is an important connection between networked governance and research on the determinants of individual participation in collective climate action. To understand this connection, we need to conceive of networked climate governance as an opportunity structure, which may upscale local-level climate action to higher levels and encourage citizens' involvement. Given the complexity of global climate governance, however, it is important to explain opportunity structures in understandable ways, which bears some challenges. On the one hand, organizations participating in networked governance will need to invest in communication, but resource constraints may make doing so difficult. On the other hand, the approach requires some 30 could be applied to address this research question.
Conclusion
This review had two key starting points: first, the empirical manifestation of a growing number of transnational climate partnerships; 1, 66, 70 second, the realization that adequate responses to climate change require innovative policy responses 30 and collective action 14 on a variety of scales to bring about fundamental social change. 4 While disparate at first glance, the new global climate governance architecture and collective climate action are connected to one another in important ways. As we argue above, networked climate governance serves as an opportunity structure for collective climate action in the sense that it may potentially encourage individuals to join group-level climate actions.
The rationale underlying this expectation is that individuals who are, in principal, willing to participate in such initiatives (e.g. renewable energy cooperatives) may be even more convinced to do so when they realize that their actions transpire beyond the local level and when doing so matches their broader value, norm, and identity-based orientations. At the same time, networked governance requires social innovation 6, 27, 28, 38, 77 and learning 19, 120 to produce effective climate change responses.
Currently, comparatively few grassroots organizations -the form of local-level collective at the centre of this review -participate in networked climate governance.
it is a deliberate decision of grassroots organizations to concentrate their activities on the local level; framework in such a way that they decide whether and which advocacy coalition to join depending on how they perceive the institutional venues. Exploring and potentially strengthening this link will greatly enrich our current understanding of climate governance and ultimately contribute to its effectiveness.
As stated above, the core objective of this review was to build bridges between different types of literatures and levels of analysis. Given this goal we did not pay attention to contributions within the respective literatures, which represent more controversial views or stress uncertainties inherent to the theoretical lenses applied. We focused on individuals and the structures that surround them, but acknowledge this is a somewhat limited analytical perspective. Arguably, conceptualising individuals as atomistic, rational actors, or by contrast as entirely constrained by institutions or discourses are extreme ends of an extensive continuum. We believe that depending on the issue and contextual circumstances, most cases will fall somewhere on this continuum (rather than the ends). In a world where everything is controlled by rigid and unmovable discourses, it seems futile to even begin to think of change emanating from individuals (but there are many examples where this does appear to happen, as we show in the article). By the same token, assuming that individuals are staunch, unconstrained rationalists who can make whatever choice they like under any circumstances is equally unreasonable. In fact, we show in numerous ways how a range of external factors influence individuals, at times in irrational ways. With any particular issue, it is task of sound social research to identify the opportunities and constraints emanating from the complex nexus of individuals, social structures, and other elements, such as characteristics of the material world. All are likely to play some role in transformational responses to climate change. 4 We believe that the literatures we review in this article provide useful pointers for researchers to explore climate change-related issues with a view to individual, social structures, and the material
world. Yet we would like to flag that there exist other theoretical perspectives and assessment of the empirical phenomena presented here and we invite future research to consider engaging with that literature in a view to complete the picture we presented.
Alongside our call to consider a multitude of theoretical perspectives when investigating the relationship between collective climate action and networked climate governance, there are several empirical research questions that warrant future attention. While we have already highlighted some of these in the previous section, we believe that investigating whether networked climate governance is helping grassroots organizations to become a more central players in climate politics, or whether these groups remain at the fringes, is of particular importance. 6, 27, 49, [121] [122] [123] In other words and following the insights offered by Pattberg: 70 does a growing number of grassroots movements involved in transnational climate partnerships lead to new activities that then lead to behavioural changes? This is just one of many worthy research questions bringing together global climate governance and social change attained by individuals.
Governance
Governance can be understood as 'shaping society in desired directions'. 110 While the state plays a key role in governing, 30 most studies in governance are interested in why non-state actors take matters into their own hands and act as substitutes for or in collaboration with government. In other words, it is about the relationship and cooperation of state and non-state actors in solving societal problems.
The past decades have witnessed an increase in the governance of common goods involving public and private -or state and non-state -actors. This phenomenon has been analysed by many different terms including private governance, civil regulation, voluntary governance, co-governance, transnational or global governance, or corporate social responsibility. 10 Governance as a concept is also used in anthropology, communication science, economics, sociology, and psychology. In anthropology, the role of cultural values for the working of governance is addressed. In communication science, the role of political and social communication lies at the heart of governancerelated research. Transaction costs, as well as how governance can help to reduce them, has been examined by economists. Studies in sociology are interested in the complexity of how governance is achieved, and how social environment and institutional rules affects governance systems. Since governance is about behavioural steering, it is closely interconnected with psychological concepts such as nudging. 
